

Research Article

**Social Interaction And The Practice Of Power
Among Small Fishers**

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Abstract

Relations between humans and social groups always involve power. Power exists in all fields of life; it includes the ability to govern and also make decisions that directly influence the actions of others. This study aims to determine how social interaction and power practices between the crew and shipowner; and between crews on small vessels. This research was conducted with a descriptive-qualitative approach using a case study strategy. The study was conducted in Muarareja Urban Village, West Tegal Subdistrict, Tegal City, Central Java Province. The results showed that small scale fishers in Muarareja Urban Village, Tegal City can be categorized as daily fishers and weekly fishers. The practice of power between the owner and the daily crew on the small vessels has an exploitative relationship dimension. This relationship is indicated by the compulsion of the shipowner to the crew to keep fishing even though the weather is bad or during a low season. The practice of power between the shipowner and the crew was strongly influenced by the shipowner's debt to the Bank or middleman, which must be paid every month. On the other hand, the practice of power exercised by the weekly fishers to the shipowner is by being able to resign and choose to work with other shipowners easily. If the crew feels uncomfortable working on a ship, they will look for a new shipowner.

Keywords: *Relationship and Practice of Power; Exploitative; Patron-Client; Tegal City; Fishers.*

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INTRODUCTION

Fisheries Law No. 31 Article 1 of 2014, defines fisher as a person whose occupation and livelihood comes from fishing. Small fishers in Article 1 are defined as people whose livelihoods come from fishing to fulfil their daily needs. Kinseng (2014) classified fishers into four classes, namely fishing labourer, small fisher, middle-class fisher, and large fisher. Kinseng stated that there was an element of exploitation in the workers-owner relationship (in the case of fishing conflict in Balikpapan), including economic exploitation by the owner to the crew. On the other hand, the relationship between the owner and the crew is also a patron-client. As stated by Scott (1983), in this relationship, the owners act as a patron who provides various assistance to their crews.

Furthermore, Kinseng (2014) suggested that the assistance provided by the owner to the crew is in the form of lending money, paying medical expenses, providing fees for returning home or paying marriage fees. Although this pattern of patron-client relations can also contain elements of domination and exploitation, its nature is still different from exploitation and dominance in non-patron-client relations. Exploitation and dominance in the pattern of patron-client relations are smoother while the dominance of providing assistance is considerably higher than the pattern of labour-employer relations that are not patron-client. Even though the relationship between the owner and the fishers is exploitative, Kinseng (2014) also explains that the fishers' views towards the owner are generally positive. One fisher admits to feel proud because he is loyal and has never switched owners. Thus, it can be concluded that not all practices of power towards fishers are negative; some of these practices of power are positive.

According to Parsons (1954), the practice of power is a zero-sum process whereby one party will benefit, and the other will bear the loss. This zero-sum approach causes power to be inevitable from a conflict where the opposing class will try to maintain or gain power (Parsons in Dahrendorf, 1986: 208). According to Weber (1950), however, power is the possibility of an actor in social relations to be in a position to carry out one's will despite the resistance, regardless of the foundation on which the possibility is placed. Power is classically defined by Weber (1950) as: "The chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Weber in Dahrendorf 1986: 202) In other words, power is a form of subjugation of others in order to make other people follow one's will.

Furthermore, Foucault (1980: 198) stated that power always exists in social relations. Power is spread everywhere both in individuals, organizations, or institutions. Power relations can occur in the form of conflict or competition, cooperation (negotiation), and resistance in ob-

taining benefits from resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003, Bryant and Bailey 1997, Scott 1990, and Royandi 2018). Furthermore, the working mechanism of power cannot be separated from resistance; or in other words, where power works, there must be resistance (Foucault 1980: 141, Haryatmoko 2003: 228 and Maring 2010: 19). According to Dahrendorf (1986: 191), human life in society is always based on power conflicts that are not solely caused by economic factors, but also because of the diverse aspects that exist in society.

On the other hand, Dahrendorf (1986) places conflict as something endemic or always present in people's lives. As stated by Suparlan (2004), that in every community, there are potential conflicts since every citizen has an interest that must be fulfilled. In the process of fulfilment, the interests of other communities must be sacrificed (Suparlan in Maring, 2010: 23). Furthermore, Kinseng (2014: 4) explained that social conflicts among fishers in Indonesia to date have often been destructive and violent. In various cases of the conflict, fishers used various sharp weapons, including arrows and Molotov cocktails. They also set fire to the vessels and fishing gear of the opposing fishers. Therefore, conflicts among fishers in Indonesia to date have claimed the property and even the lives of many fishers.

Several studies (state of the art) previously conducted by Wijaya (2014) describe the relations and practices of power in the tourism industry in Bali - a place to receive and practice of power - is seen as truth by various parties. The next study was carried out by Febriyanto (2010), who explained about actors and power relations in mangrove management that were not disorganized and ineffective. When the structural and relational access mechanism is well implemented, businessmen are able to convert mangroves into intensive shrimp ponds. The next study was conducted by Royandi (2018) on interest groups and power relations in the management of Palabuhanratu marine resources. The study suggests that all actors build power through rights-based access mechanisms, structure-based access mechanisms; and social relations with the basis of capital, market, technology, knowledge, social identity, authority and patron-client authority. Local fishing groups, outsider fishers (Banten fishers), and Javanese migrant fishers try to maintain access, while Bugis ethnic fishing groups try to control access to marine resources. The differences in position among fishers groups lead to power relations among fishing groups in obtaining Palabuhanratu marine resources.

Furthermore, a study conducted by Nurdin and Grydehoj (2015) on patron-client governance in destructive fishing relationships in Makassar explains that this destructive fishing practice is related to the political and social areas of patron-client relations. Subsequent studies were conducted by Conway et al. (2017) which describes the obstacles of symbolic power in the arena of intergenerational family farm transfers in Ireland. This journal presents a detailed analysis of

the way the older generation promotes and maintains managerial control and their dominance as heads of family farms. The practice of profit-sharing in research conducted by Mulyana (2015) explains that fishers only provide human resources (labour). In contrast, all costs during preparation and operational capture are taken from the gross proceeds before being shared by both parties.

Scott (1981) defines patron-client as the exchange of relations between two roles in an economic bond that has social implications, i.e. the bond between an individual with a higher socioeconomic status (patron) and an individual who has a lower socioeconomic status (client). Patron uses its influence and resources to provide protection and benefits to clients, while clients provide support and assistance, including services to patrons. According to Scott (1981), the characteristic of the patron-client relationship is the existence of inequality in exchange that illustrates the differences in power, wealth, and position. There is an unbalanced relationship between patron-client; a win-lose position, where the patron is in the win position and the client is losing.

Studies conducted by Minnaro et al. (2016) describes the patron-client relationship among the fishing community in facing the scarcity of marine resources. The patron-client social configuration system influences marine resources through exploitation. Their role in the fisheries value chain has also diminished as new regulations, and management policies are implemented. Furthermore, O'neill (2019), argues that the patron-client system is widely used in various rural economies and small-scale fisheries. Research by Njaya and Donda (2011), on the other hand, shows that co-management arrangements are characterized by the uneven distribution of power among different actors, often resulting in the marginalization of fishers. In this new institutional landscape, the perceived roles of key partners, including traditional leaders and the fisheries department, are still unclear, with a combination of positive and negative results.

The Pathmanandakumar Study (2017) states that the majority of fishers are involved in small-scale fishing in Sri Lanka and face difficulties in overcoming the problem of marine populations. Fish stocks decline and threaten the reproductive capacity. If this continues, the livelihoods of poor fishers will be problematic in the future; therefore, there must be a change in fisheries policy. In addition, fundamental reforms must be carried out to manage small-scale fisheries. Small-scale fisheries in Sri Lanka rely heavily on external controls which make the sector unsustainable.

Furthermore, Hamzah (2017) emphasizes that in social interaction, relationships are usually characterized by an exchange process. However, the exchange process is also marked by the unequal control of resources, personal relationships, and mutual benefits resulting in a patron-

client (inferior) relationship. This form of client protector can be an individual or a group. In this relationship, the client recognizes the protector as someone who has a stronger position.

Siswanto's study (2014) explains the fishers' socioeconomic conditions and the marginal position in the structure of fish farming conditions not solely created by the internal factors of the community itself. This condition is also influenced by external factors which have a significant contribution, such as capital power and the failure of local governments to carry out their roles. In the exploitation of fish in the Prigi Bay, for example, state authorities fail to enforce regulations to ensure that the mechanism of free trade markets at fish auctions which attract the interests of all actors in them is reasonable. In addition, his research also explains that fishers are classified based on their fishing gear. Nayak et al. (2014) explain the typology of the process of impoverishment which includes economic exclusion, social marginalization, class exploitation, and political powerlessness as the main mechanisms that accelerate poverty. For this reason, efforts are needed to rebuild; not only in collapsed stocks but in the entire socio-ecological system, including restoring relations between resources and people.

Power always exists in every society, both simple and complex social structures. The practice of power is always attached to individuals since all social relations contain an element of power. The power relationship creates interdependence between shipowners and crew members, as well as between crew members. On the other hand, Neis (1981) study of the fishing community in Newfoundland found that the pattern of class struggle was influenced by the power of the fishers and investors who lent capital to the fishers (Neis in Kinseng, 2014: 33). Plalteau (2016) states if workers are subject to intense organized pressure from below – probably because it is supported by broader political power. Shihara et al. (2017) also suggested that community leaders used the introduction of the Payment for Environmental Services (PES) scheme as an opportunity to strengthen the legitimacy and power that had eroded traditional institutions and dominated them institutionally. Wilson (2015) states that groups in society in decision making are driven by social structures that are still strong.

Some conclusions from the results of previous studies reveal that social practices and relationships can be positive and can also create breakthroughs. Many of the views of the crew members towards shipowners are positive, one of which is marked by the crew which confessed to feeling proud because he has never switch shipowner. Some of the crew members even mentioned that their shipowner was loyal and very considerate. Nevertheless, a dimension of the exploitative-dominative relationship was found between the shipowner and the crew in small vessels in Tegal City. The crew must be fishing every day. This situation happens because the ship-

owner has a debt to the Bank that must be paid every month. It means that the relationship between the shipowner and the crew is not always patron-client in nature.

One area that has considerable fishing potential is Tegal City. Tegal City is a city in Central Java Province, and some of its people depend on fishing. According to data from the Department of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs of Central Java Province, in 2011, Tegal City ranks third which has the highest value of marine fisheries production in the Central Java Province. Geographically, Tegal City only has a coastline of around 6 km, but it can produce 35,206.3 tons of marine fisheries with a production value of around 218 billion rupiahs. As a comparison, Tegal Regency, which has a coastline length of up to 26 km, is only able to produce 1,269.9 tons of marine fisheries production with a production value of around 7 billion rupiahs.

The novelty of this research lies within its aim to find out how social interactions and power practices between crews and shipowners of small vessels using mini bottom trawls fishing gear. The study was conducted in Muarareja, West Tegal District, Tegal City, Central Java Province. Muarareja fish auction is an auction site for small fishers. The majority of fishers who performed auction at the Muarareja fish auction are daily fishers; as for weekly fishers, the fish auction is conducted at Jongor Port. Jongor Port is one of the major fishing auction sites for fishers which use trawl, purse seine, and gillnet fishing gear; although more dominated by fishing trawlers. Therefore, based on the explanation above, this topic becomes essential to study.

RESEARCH METHOD

The research was carried out starting from the beginning of July 2018 as a preliminary assessment while the research continuation was conducted in early December 2018 until March 2019. The research was conducted with a qualitative approach using a case study strategy. Irwan (2018) explains that social reality is a phenomenon whose existence is determined by other social phenomena (interrelated variables) and its existence can be described as symbols that have been determined in society. Problems in society can not only be explained through constructivism, but there are social phenomena that need to be explained in other paradigms, such as the positivism. The data sources in this study are primary and secondary data, which obtained through 1) field observations - researchers observe various activities such as fish unloading activities, selling catches, the auction process of catches, and social activities carried out at the study site; 2) in-depth interviews with fishers informants from the City of Tegal, specifically at the Muarareja fish auction; 3) in-depth interviews with shipowners, crews, captains, and machinists on small vessels; 4) Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with crew members; and 5) secondary data collection includes shipowner data reports, catches, regional statistical reports (urban demographics and

monographs), and other relevant documents. The selection of informants is made using purposive sampling technique. The data source was chosen based on specific considerations, namely between the owner of the small vessel, the owner and the crew, and between the crew of the small vessel with a total of 14 informants and the individual as the unit of analysis. After all data and information have been collected, qualitative-descriptive data analysis is then carried out through three stages, namely data reduction, data presentation, and verification (Creswell, 2016: 253). The data reduction process has been carried out since the researchers were in the field. The data presentation stage is used for drawing conclusions; this stage can be in the form of an analysis matrix, picture chart and analysis table. Then, conclusions can be drawn from existing data and then field verification can be carried out.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The potential of Tegal City's fishery resources is dominated by capture fisheries activities that operate in coastal and offshore waters. This fishery activity is supported by 3 marketing facilities in the form of fish auctions (Pelabuhan fish auction, Tegalsari fish auction and Muarareja fish auction) which makes fisheries in the Tegal City well-developed. The fish auctions in the City of Tegal anchoring various vessels such as a small traditional fishing boat, gillnet, trawl, and purse seine which unload the catch. These fish auction sites encourage the development of fish trading business activities, including the fish processing industry.

Small fishers in Muarareja mostly use mini bottom trawling fishing gear. However, during the wave season, some fishers turn to trap fishing gear. Trap (*Bubu*) is a special fishing gear used by fishers to catch abundant crabs during the high waves. One of the crew members interviewed about how the life of small fishers in Muarareja was KH. The fishers who have been fishing for ten years said:

“... A fishing trip usually takes one week, after then, we return to land. Our fishing area, the small fishers, are around the north coast (*Pantura*). The work of settling residents here is only as fishers. I and other fishers do not have any other job besides being a fisher. If it is high wave season, or if it is not the season of fish, I usually do not work at all or are unemployed and wait until the season returns to normal. There are also many other fishers is unemployed like me during the high wave season. The fishers here usually go to the sea ten times a month. The fishing gear used are mini bottom trawl and fish traps to catch small crabs. The catches obtained are shrimp, squid, anchovy, bloated fish, and mackerel. I have four family members; my two children are no longer in school and help fishing ...”

Capture fisheries activities operate in coastal and offshore waters. Fishers in Muarareja are small fishers with the division of fishing time as daily fishers and weekly fishers. A daily fisher usually goes to the sea in the morning after the dawn prayer and returns in the afternoon. Daily fishers will unload the catches at the Muarareja fish auction and directly auction the fish; some sell directly to fish auctions, but some sell it to the middleman. For weekly fishers, however, they usually carry out fishing operations for a week to two weeks. For weekly fishers, the factors that determine their length in the sea are supplies such as fuel (diesel), ice blocks, and food. The catches of daily fishers are small crab, puff, mackerel, and shrimp for shrimp paste; whereas the catch for weekly fishers in the form of goldband goatfish, Japanese threadfin bream, anchovies, *pirik* fish (*Lagusia micracanthus*), squid, and crab. To see the social interactions of small fishers, researchers will describe portraits of the daily lives of fishers such as the daily fishers and weekly fishers' activities below.

Capture fisheries activities operate in coastal and offshore waters. From the results of field observations, fishers on ships over 20 GT conduct fishing in the Kalimantan and Sumatra regions and other areas outside the Java Sea; fishers on vessels with sizes below 20 GT do fishing in the waters of Tegal City and surrounding areas. These observations are also in line with the results of research conducted by Rohayati (2017) on the distribution of fishing areas to fishers in the city of Tegal. Fishers in Tegal City consist of a shipowner and crew. The most significant number of fishers in Tegal is dominated by fishers with 11,928 people while shipowners number 630 people.

Work as a fisher is not a derivative job from the family. These fishers come from various regions. However, because they live near the sea, they go fishing like everyone else. The activity of daily fishers begins with going to the sea in the morning when the sky is still dark. One of the daily crew members questioned about the activities of the daily fisher is KI, who has been a fisher for 35 years:

“...Each fishing trip consumes up to 130 litres of gasoline. The trip takes about one hour from the port. Because this is a small vessel so (I) only looking for fish near the seaside. Usually, when you have lots of fish, you can get a quintal of fish. Since it is a small vessel, it cannot fish for up to three to four days. Small vessels of 8 GT like this can only be used daily. If it is peak season, the income per day can cover supplies and can be used for saving. However, if it is not fish season (low season), even to purchase the gasoline is not enough...”

Many crews depend on their daily incomes. The daily fishers are dominated by old fishers. Their ages ranging from 50-60 years, and have long fishing experience. However, some daily fishers are still young. They followed their parents to become daily fishers. Young crew members work on large vessels with trawl, purse seine, and gillnet fishing gear that take fishing trips for up to two months. The daily fishers who depend their lives on the results of today's capture must also meet many needs apart from basic needs. These fishers also almost all have dependents of children who are still in school or grandchildren to be funded by their school needs. Many of these daily fishers also invite their children to join fishing to help make ends meet. Some of these daily fishers only have one house that is occupied by several families such as father and mother, the first son who is married, the second son who is also married and other children.

The daily fishers, both young and old, have no experience other than fishing; if not fishing, they do not have other work to do. The wives of these daily fishers work as housewives. That is, they do not have jobs that generate income. Some of them open stalls in front of their houses, others work as washing workers. For their daily food needs, their husbands usually carry a small amount of fish to eat at home; even then, if the shipowner gives a little catch to his crew. If in one day the crew does not work, it will be difficult to meet food needs. The crew does not have a guarantee to borrow money from the Bank; so they do not have the capital to buy their ship and continue to depend on the shipowner.

Many of these fishers are only able to provide education to their children until junior high school; because they do not have the cost of continuing higher education. After completing middle school, their children will usually join fishing. When they are old enough and have the experience, they will work as crews in fishing trawlers. The daily fishers are very proud if their children can work as crew in fishing trawlers because fishing trawlers in Tegal City have a pretty good income. For fishing trawlers, once a month of fishing, the crew can get a net income of approximately Rp10,000,000.00; thus unsurprisingly, their parents are very proud if their children managed to become crew on a fishing trawler. Many of the fishing trawlers who have worked diligently for years and are saving their income can buy a small vessel with a size of 5 GT and become daily fishers with status as a shipowner. However, there are also some children of daily fisher crew who help their parents join fishing to become crew members on other people's vessels.

Daily fishers do not have a fixed standard of rest. They usually do not have time to rest except when they take themselves out; they fish every day. The shipowner also joined fishing with two other ships. Usually, daily fishers are relatives of the shipowner itself; but many daily

fisher crew members are Muarareja residents. One of the crews in Muarareja is a hamlet (RW) leader who has been a fisher for 28 years. When he asked about how fishing duration and rest time for daily fishers, he said "... the daily fishers rarely have time to rest, because if we do not fish, what we can want to eat? How can we be able to pay debts to the Bank or the middleman?"

Based on the results of the study, we obtained daily fishers income data in Tegal City, detailed in Table 1 below:

Table 1. The average daily income of small fishers in Tegal by season

Season	Income per trip (Rp)	Information
Peak	300.000 - 500.000	Catches reaches 100 kg
Transition	50.000 - 150.000	Catches is only 30 kg
Low	20.000 - 50.000	Catches is only 8 kg

Source: Processed Primary Data

The average daily income of small fishers in Tegal City during peak season reaches one quintal. However, in the transition season and low season, the income obtained only reaches 2-5 basketball and can even get 8 kg. Kinseng (2014) states that conflict is a social relationship among social actors characterized by conflict or strife and anger - whether expressed openly or not - in order to achieve each other's desires or goals. Furthermore, he explained that if disputes or disputes and anger were open, he was in the category of open conflict; if disputes or disputes and anger are hidden or closed in nature, they fall into the category of latent conflict. In addition to being angry, social relations are generally also characterized by feelings of displeasure and even hate one another.

The competition among fishers is happening, even between the crew on the ship that often conflicted. Conflicts that occur are usually because one of the crew feels that the other crew is lazy at work, even though the distribution of their results will be equal. However, usually, this does not last long. If the conflict continues among the crew, the captain will act as an intermediary between them and resolve the conflict. Usually, the captain will give advice first; but if not heard, the captain will stop the crew.

Based on the basis of the formation of conflicting fishing groups (conflict groups), Kinseng (2014) divides conflicts among fishers (internal conflicts) into three categories namely: (1) class conflicts, occur between different fishing classes, for example between labourers and the owner and among the small fishing class and the big-capitalist fishers; (2) Identity conflicts, occur between primordial identity-based fishing groups such as ethnicity and origin, or often

known as local versus migrants. In addition, religion can also be used as the basis for the formation of this primordial conflict group; and (3) fishing gear conflicts, namely one that occur among groups of fishers based on different fishing gear but at equal levels. Referring to that category, conflicts that occur among fishers in Muarareja include class conflicts and fishing gear conflicts.

Potential conflicts often faced by small fishers in Muarareja are arguing with other fishers, both small fishers and big fishers. For small fishers, conflicts are usually triggered because of the fishing zone issues among fishers. This dispute caused the fishers' catch in the same fishing zone to decrease. In addition, small fishers often damage each other's fishing gear when they are in the same fishing zone. Furthermore, the trigger for conflict between small fishers and big fishers is because the fishing gear of small fishers (mini bottom trawl) is damaged by large vessels. When large vessels pass through the fishing grounds of small fishers, small fishing nets get stuck on large vessels. As a result, the net is damaged and cannot even be used anymore. This destruction triggers a conflict between small fishers and big fishers. When large fishing boats damage the fishing gear of small fishers, the ship does not want to replace the damaged fishing gear. One of the shipowners from the Daily Fishers who was questioned about the conflict among fishers is Sutiman who has been a fisher for 30 years saying:

“... Conflicts among ships is inevitable. If at sea, it is usually caused by the capture area and the net which stuck in another ship, whereas they do not want to compensate. If it is lightly damaged, repairing the net would require around Rp200,000 - Rp500,000.00; if it is fully damaged, it will cost around Rp4,000,000.00. Sometimes it triggers a conflict among ships and between fishers to the point of fighting in the sea. Just imagine if the net is damaged by someone else, but they do not want to replace it. Of course, it will incur a loss, the result is nonexistent plus he cannot fishing since the net is broken...”

The form of resistance carried out by small fishers when their nets are damaged by throwing stones at large ships causing disputes. Large ships, however, do not remain silent; if the fishing boats are in conflict, it is not uncommon for large vessels to push the small vessels. As a result, the small vessel will be severely damaged. The same resistance is also done among small fishers. When they conflict, the form of resistance is also in the form of throwing stones at ships that are considered to cause chaos and also fighting among fishers, which causes the fishers injured. This situation is in line with what was stated by Kinseng (2014: 4), which explains the social conflicts among fishers in Indonesia to date are often destructive and violent. In various cases of the conflict, fishers used various sharp weapons, including arrows and Molotov cocktails. They also set fire to the vessels and fishing gear of the opposing fishers. Therefore, the conflict

among fishers in Indonesia to date has claimed property and even human lives that are not insignificant from the fishers.

Weekly fishers are dominated by young fishers; their age ranges from 30-40 years. Many of the crew members already have family dependents, but some do not yet have dependents. The difference between daily fishers and weekly fishers is in their rest time. The daily fishers have almost no particular break time unless the fishers take their days off. Weekly fishers still have about three to four days of rest after returning from fishing. After resting, they went fishing again. Break time is used to gather with family and also help prepare supplies for the next trip. Many of these weekly fishers are not local Tegal City fishers; they come from various regions outside Tegal City such as from Brebes, Cirebon, Indramayu, Lamongan, Karawang and also from various other regions. They use their day off by returning to their respective regions and will come back to Tegal City when the fishing schedule has been determined.

The members of the weekly fishers' ship who are mostly young have two to three children. The same thing is also found for the work of their wives. The crew members wives only worked as housewives; all household needs depends on working as crews. For weekly fishers, shipowners usually do not participate in fishing operations. The captain is shipowners' right-hand man. However, the shipowner continues to provide supervision; for example, during loading and unloading or when departing, the shipowner is in the field to monitor and taking care of his crew needs. If a shipowner from the daily fishers doubles as a captain and meets with his crew every day, shipowners from the weekly fishers are not as frequent as the daily fishers in meeting the shipowners. Weekly fisher crew will meet shipowners when they are on land because shipowners do not join fishing. When on land, shipowners also often come to the field to see their ships. The shipowners also repair ships or repair damaged nets along with other crew members.

The relationship between the shipowner and the crew in the small vessel is binding. This binding relationship is because the shipowner will provide various forms of ties such as loans, assistance, and also awards to the crew so that they continue to work with the owner. Giving awards in the form of more income, in the form of money that will be given to the crew if they get more catch than the previous. In addition, the owner also provides assistance to the crew who need loans. This assistance was given because the owner wants to bind the crew to continue working on the owner's ship since the crew on the weekly fishers can also choose to work on the weekly fishers or work as a crew on the fishing trawler. The difficulty of getting crews makes shipowners provide various assistance to the crews; this is because the crew can choose to work

with the desired shipowner. If the crew feel uncomfortable working in a ship's owner, they will move to find a new shipowner.

Similarly, the captain can freely choose to work on another owner's ship. Therefore, the crew got a significant "power" and relations to the owner. The practice of power exercised by crews against shipowners can occur because of the existence of large fishing trawlers who need more crew members. Therefore, the crew on a small vessel can choose to work with other vessels. In terms of income, fishing trawlers get more income than daily fishers or weekly fishers. However, they will be difficult to gather with the family since fishers trawlers were fishing for up to two months.

Fishers in Muarareja are divided into shipowners, captains, machinists and crews. The size of the ship is also very diverse ranging from the smallest 5 GT to 20 GT using mini bottom trawling fishing gear. Some shipowners also go fishing with other crew members; the shipowners usually also serve as captains on their ships. The shipowners who join fishing are those that only own one to two vessels. The shipowners who have more than three vessels do not participate in fishing. The shipowner will find a captain to replace the shipowner. One of the shipowners who also serves as a captain in Muarareja is KN, who has been a fisher for 33 years:

"... In Muarareja, since the size of the gross tonnage of the ship is not inadequate, many owners also go fishing. The shipowners who have one to two ships are still fishing. However, if the shipowner already has more than three ships, the shipowner is no longer join fishing. They usually looking for another captain to lead the ship. Even if there is a shipowner inside the ship, the captain retains full control; the ship is the responsibility of the captain. However, when on land, it is the responsibility of the shipowner. When shipowners join fishing, cooperation is still carried out with other crew members. No feeling of shy or anything; the most important thing is to have is strong solidarity, helping each other on the vessel ..."

Furthermore, RW also explained how the activities before leaving for fishing and after returning from fishing for weekly fishers:

"... Each trip is usually taking one to two weeks. Usually, the duration for fishing is determined by the amount of diesel fuel carried. If there is still much fuel, I still fish; but if the diesel fuel runs out, I go home. Even so, there are also shipowners who provide a benchmark for fishing; for example, fishing is only allowed a week including brought supplies for a week only as well. Furthermore, the resting period after fishing usually takes two days or more, then depart fishing again. While on land, the activities carried out are repairing nets, repairing ship engines and preparing for the next supplies that will be taken to the sea for the next week..."

For weekly fishers, they usually spend two to three days to rest. In addition to resting, this time is used to help prepare supplies to be taken for the next fishing trip and also to repair damaged vessels or nets. Next, the shipowner determines where to sell the fish. The fishers can choose freely where they will sell the catch they get if they do not have a debt to the middleman. Usually, fishers will choose where the highest price is between the fish auction and the middleman. However, if the owner has a debt to the middleman, he/she is obliged to sell at a predetermined price. This condition will continue until their debt is paid off. In Tegal, fishers only need to pay their principal debt without interest. Based on the results of the study, the weekly fishers income data obtained in Tegal City are detailed in Table 2 as follows:

Table 2. The Average Weekly Income of Small Fishers in Tegal by Season

Season	Income per trip (Rp)
Peak	5.000.000 - 7.000.000
Transition	2.000.000 - 5.000.000
Low	200.000 - 500.000

Source: Processed Primary Data

For each fishing trip, fishers usually incur costs for supplies of as much as Rp1,000,000.00 up to a maximum of Rp5,000,000.00 for weekly fishers. After returning home, sometimes income can reach Rp7,000,000.00 after deducting supplies. However, sometimes a small income even in some fishing trips never generate income. Therefore, many fishers who have gone fishing then returned with no results even for only a week. They worry about being in vain; the supplies had run out but nothing. Moreover, if the supplies are not enough so before the supplies are finished, the fishers go home first.

When the low season comes, many fishers are unemployed because the fishers have no other ability besides fishing. When not fishing, their activity is repairing damaged nets and also repairing ships. After the low season had passed, the fishers left to operate again. The crew in the low season will also stop working. They will help the owner repair damaged ships and nets. However, it is different from daily fishers, even though the waves are high and the low season comes they will still go fishing.

For profit-sharing, if a shipowner joins fishing, the shipowner will get his share. For example, when leaving for fishing supplies issued as much as Rp1,000,000.00 after returning from fishing to get a sale of Rp3,000,000.00 then the results are reduced by the amount of supply capital until the remaining amount of Rp2,000,000.00. This income is then distributed to the owner

in the amount of Rp1,000,000.00, and the remainder is distributed to the crew. If the captain of the ship is not a shipowner, the captain will get two parts, one part of the profit-sharing with the crew and another part of the shipowner.

Conflicts among fishers continue like a competition between ships, between fishers, or even between crew members who are always there. The conflict is most likely to occur because one fisher was jealous of seeing another fisher. In this case, jealousy can come from the income of other fishers who are higher than their income or because other fishers buy new equipment for their ships. The catch of these fishers is more than usual with the sale of more expensive compared to other vessels. These problems are the source of jealous conflict among fishers. As a result, a lot of theft was carried out on the ship's equipment that had just been bought by the fishers such as the keys to machine tools, fishing gear, and even fuel from the ship.

Before going fishing, fishers usually prepare all the supplies that will be brought such as fuel, ice cubes, and vessel engine equipment as well as supplies that will be carried while fishing. After everything is finished, the shipowner and the crew will leave the ship at the port and return tomorrow at the designated time of departure. However, on the day of departure, many supplies were lost; ship engines are damaged even the glass of the ship is damaged so that it cannot run. If the theft of the provisions is known at the beginning, fishers will not go fishing. However, if the theft of diesel fuel, ice cubes, and other supplies are only discovered after the ship departs, it will be troublesome. Running out of fuel while in the middle of a trip caused by theft will make it difficult for fishers to continue fishing trips. These incidents are still often encountered today, as stated by SN:

“... The problem of jealousy towards others will never go if we are never grateful. Moreover, this fishing community is not educated people. Therefore, their mind is still shallow and easily emotional when their friends get a fortune. If you think about it, everyone's fortune has been arranged. It is just that, as a human, certainly many people are not grateful for life ...”

Meanwhile, some fishers stated that fellow small fishers must help each other. If there are fishing boats that run out of diesel fuel or supplies on the sea, usually other fishers will provide assistance. According to their experience, it is impossible for every vessel that departs fishing to run normally without any problems; every ship will definitely experience unexpected problems while at sea. That kind of way of thinking makes the fishers always help one another.

Small vessels in this study refer to the classification of fishing boats, according to Kin-seng (2014). Small fishers are those who have vessels with size less than 10 GT with one to four people or driven by the shipowner without the help of the crew. The cost of fishing supplies usu-

ally ranges from IDR 300,000-IDR 1,000,000.00 for one fishing trip. The income of the crew in small vessels once fishing is around Rp 100,000.

Most shipowners in Muarareja have vessels resulting from debts owed to middlemen and also debts from banks. To meet the monthly debt payments to the Bank or the middleman, the crew must be fishing every day even though it is a low season or the wave season. This action was done to fulfil the payment of the shipowner's debt to the Bank so that the ship must continue to operate. As stated by TJ:

“... The crew is also required to go fishing since they also need to meet their household needs. Every day, it is possible to bring a salary of Rp100,000,000 or a maximum of Rp300,000.00. The household needs to be paid monthly are water, electricity, kitchen needs, children pocket money, and children's school needs. Therefore, like it or not, you have to keep fishing. If I take a day off, the shipowner can immediately replace me with another crew ...”

According to Foucault (2002), a class becomes a dominant class and can assure its dominance because dominance is capable of producing itself. Among the strategies that mix, produce, duplicate, and highlight the power relations that exist and the class which then realizes in a position of command, there is a reciprocal relation of production. The daily fishing vessels in Muarareja are generally the result of borrowing money from banks and middlemen with guaranteed house certificates. This condition causes the fishers to have to fish every day despite bad weather or during low season. Large waves do not become a barrier to the fishers. If they do not go fishing, it would be difficult to repay debts to the Bank; if payments are in arrears, the house and the boat will be confiscated by the Bank.

The order to continue fishing every day even during low season and the dismissal of crew members who do not work is a form of exploitation by shipowners to the crew. The crew also realized that they were forced by the shipowners to continue working. However, in order to make ends meet, they accept and undertake this. That is, the crew as the dominant class feels capable of producing themselves, and of course, there is a reciprocal relationship between the shipowner and the crew. The reciprocal relationship is that both benefit from the work of the exploitation. The shipowners can pay debts to banks and crews can fulfil their daily needs.

The majority of Muarareja fisher who has one boat is the result of loans from the Bank. The fishers believe that it is better to have a boat even though it is a result of debt rather than being a crew forever. This condition causes the fishers in Muarareja to go fishing every day to meet debt payments to the Bank and also meet other needs such as paying for clean water and electricity bills which, if accumulated, can reach Rp30,000.00 - Rp50,000.00 Every month. On the one

hand, the crew will continue fishing because their job is only as a fisher and has no other skills besides fishing; on the other hand, if the crew does not come to work, the shipowner will replace the other crew. The practice of power that occurs to daily crew members is in the form of coercion of shipowners to the daily crew for fishing every day without holidays. Once the crew does not come to work, the shipowner will replace them with someone else. For weekly fishers, the practice of power tends to be more relaxed because the weekly fishers still have sufficient rest time before carrying out fishing operations on the next day. If the shipowner has a debt to the Bank or middleman, the practice of power performed is by forcing the shipowners to sell catches to the middleman.

Furthermore, if the shipowner and the middleman already have a bonding relationship such as debt, the middleman will give a low price on the catch of the shipowner. This condition continues until the debt to the middleman is paid off. So, it can be said that everyone in the fishing circle uses the practice of their power. In Muarareja, for example, the shipowner gives power to the crew; the shipowner also gets the practice of power from other parties, such as from the middleman. In line with what was said by Foucault (1980: 198) that power always exists in social relations; that power is spread everywhere both in individuals, organizations or institutions. The daily crew members cannot express their opinions and have no choice but to follow the owner's orders because they also need work to fulfil their basic needs.

Scott (1990) suggests that client-patron illustrates the powerlessness of clients over the power of patronage. The relationship becomes lasting because of the client's inability to change existing conditions, thereby forming a good relationship. A strong patron-client relationship between shipowners and crew members because they need each other. The relationship between the shipowner and the crew is not only strong when in the production arena, but also continues to exist outside the production arena. The crew cannot express their opinions and have no choice but to follow the shipowner's orders because they also need work to fulfil their basic needs. As Scott (1990) pointed out, the patterns of interaction, attitudes, behaviour and imaging produced by the ruling class seek to build the legitimacy of power and control the patterns of life shared, while the lower classes often show adherence to the rules, norms, and policies formed by the ruling class.

For weekly fisher crew, they tend to be able to express opinions if something does not suit their work and can also choose to work with other shipowners. In line with Kinseng (2014), visually the pattern of relations and practices of the power of shipowners and crew on small vessels is presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The pattern of relationships and practices of shipowner and crew members on small vessels

Thus, it can be concluded that the relation and practice of the shipowner's power with the crew in the small vessel include the exploitative-dominative power relation because the shipowner can force the crew to fish every day. According to Wright (1987), exploitation is more than just economic oppression, but also includes the element of annexing the work of one class by another class. Another critical element in exploitation is the welfare of the class in which the exploit depends on the work of the exploited class. Wright (1987) says: "... the welfare of exploiting class depends on the work of the exploited class". Referring to the definition of exploitation from Wright, the shipowner's relationship with the crew in the small vessel contains elements of exploitation. In this relationship, the shipowner forces the crew to continue fishing despite bad weather or low season. In line with what was conveyed by TQ - a shipowner from a small vessel in Muarareja: "...Today, the moon is hotter than the sun because every month I am always being chased by debt; debt from the Bank or the middleman ..."

Nevertheless, it should be noted that this exploitative-dominative relationship is especially true among shipowners who have debts to banks or debts to middlemen. However,

some shipowners are more understanding; employ crew members properly and not exploitative. However, we can be sure that this more understanding shipowner is a shipowner that is not involved in debt, so it does not force the crew to fish. When the wave season, the shipowner will take the crew off fishing. This opportunity is used by the crew to look for other jobs such as finding crabs in ponds, looking for crabs, or even just repairing damaged nets. If the season returns to normal, they will return to fishing.

Relations and the fishers' practice of power generally are more often in the arena of production, but relations and practices of power are also in the arena of non-production. Outside the capture arena can be found relations and practices of power between the shipowner and the crew, and between the crew such as at home and social life; although, indirectly, there must be among them who have a relationship in everyday life. One fisher who was questioned about the relationship between the shipowner and the crew outside the production arena was SN - a crew member on a small vessel:

“... After fishing, the crew and the shipowner will take care of themselves, maybe communicating when sharing the results. If the ship departs again, it will likely be texted or called back - usually, they will be gathered at the shipowner's house. If the crew needs money, the shipowner will provide a loan, with the condition that the crew remains in the owner's ship until the crew's debt is paid off, without using interest or additional fees. The amount of money returned to the shipowner is the same as the amount borrowed by the crew ...”

SN's statement made clear the relationship between the shipowner and the crew still exists. The shipowner will continue to communicate with the crew to keep them binding so that they continue to work with the shipowner. If the crew needs money, the owner will give a loan to the crew. When the crew has a debt to the owner, the beneficiary is the shipowner; the crew will continue to work on the ship so that the shipowner does not need to find another crew when he wants to fish.

The fishers spend more time at sea than on land, because if they do not fish, they will not be able to meet their daily needs such as electricity payments and pam water. Furthermore, small fishers also spend more time at sea than on land. What makes fishers stay long on land is when there is a broken net or boat; a more extended rest period is used to repair the damaged one first. Usually, the relationship between the shipowner and the crew in the environment is seen during social events like sea alms.

Sea alms or “*Sedekah Laut*” are done once a year in the month Sura; the alms of the sea is mandatory for shipowners and crews. Sea alms is an expression of gratitude of the fishing com-

munity for the gift of God Almighty for the abundance of fishers' catches. This tradition is also carried out for the safety of all fishers in Tegal City and hopes that the sea can be friendly with the fishers. Sea alms is also a symbol of fishers unity and the hope of citizens who depend on the marine wealth for their economy. Everyone on the ship - both the owner and the crew - donated an agreed amount of money to pay for the alms ceremony. If a child of one crew member is sick, the shipowner must visit and give money as well as food to the child. This practice will take turns; if one day a shipowner's child sick, the crew will come with some money and food such as fruits, bread, major vegetables, and even fish - the same one that the shipowner brought when visiting their sick children. Furthermore, if the crew does not have money, the crew will borrow money from others.

Traditions in the Muarareja environment still have a strong mutual relationship. This situation is in line with what was stated by Scott (1981) that patron-client is an exchange of relations between two roles in an economic bond that has social implications, namely a bond between an individual with a higher socioeconomic status (patron) and individuals who have social status lower economy (clients). Patron uses its influence and resources to provide protection and benefits to clients; instead, clients provide support and assistance, including personal services to patrons. This condition again confirms that shipowners do these things solely to maintain relationships and interactions with the crew to keep it going well.

When resting, some of the crew will help repair damaged nets or repair the ship's engine and usually assisted by the shipowner. The shipowners in the small vessels do not impose excessive authority to the crew, because if the crew feels less valued, the crew will resign and look for another shipowner. Nowadays, it is difficult to find crew members who want to work on small vessels; most of the crew work on larger vessels with the fishing time of up to two months. This condition affected the crew on the small vessels. If the owner is misbehaved, no crew will work on his/her ship. That situation makes shipowners always obey the crew demand to keep them working on his/her ship. This condition again confirms that the crew also has "power" to influence the shipowner. One of the crew questioned about the relationship between the shipowner and the crew while on land was Lin, who had been a fisher for ten years:

"... Now if the shipowner is troubling, there will be no crew who can stand working, for example, the owner is stingy and fond of excessive mumbling. Currently, there are not many crew members who work in small vessels, unlike in large vessels, which employs many crews. Here the daily fishers understand. Young crew members certainly do not want to work with stingy and troublesome shipowners. Here, the crew already know the character of all shipowners..."

Other community activities in the form of group gatherings or environmental clean-up and mutual assistance events. When the fishers are on land, they will come to fulfil their obligations as residents of the Muarareja village. However, if they are at sea, these activities will be replaced by the wives of the fishers. If his wife is also unable to attend, they will replace it by providing food and drinks or giving money to the local village head. Since the majority of residents there work as fishers, the other residents understand that some of them rarely participate in environmental activities. If the children are older, they can also be replaced by children; although children rarely participate in environmental activities because when children are older, they will work without time to attend community events, except when they are on holiday.

CONCLUSION

This study shows that the practice of power between the owner (shipowner) and the crew on a small vessel has an exploitative-dominative relationship dimension. The relationship is characterized by the presence of force from the shipowner crew to keep fishing even though the weather is bad or during the low season. The daily crew members are dominated by those who are old and have no skills other than fishing. The practice of power is caused by the shipowner's debt to the Bank or the middleman, which must be paid every month; forcing the crew to continue fishing. Even daily crew members do not have regular rest periods. If the daily crew resign, the owner will replace it with another. The daily crew cannot refuse shipowner's orders because they only depend on fishing for their lives. However, it is not only crews who get forms of practice of power from shipowners. The shipowner also got the practice of power from the middleman where they owed. The middleman's practice of power for shipowners is to require all catches to be sold to the middleman at the predetermined price. In line with what was stated by Foucault, power always exists in social relations, and it is spread everywhere, both in individuals, organizations, or institutions.

Furthermore, weekly fishers are dominated by young crew members. The practice of power that is carried out by the weekly fishers to shipowners is in the form of resigning and working with other shipowners. If the crew feel uncomfortable to work on a ship, they will look for work on other ships such as fishing trawlers. To keep the crew, shipowners often provide assistance or awards in the form of bonuses. This bonus will be given to the crew if they get more catches than the previous week. The shipowners also often provide food assistance; lending money for going home and medication. Scott stated that patron-client is an exchange of relations between two roles in an economic bond that has social implications. The social implications are in the form of a bond between individuals with higher socioeconomic status (patron) to individuals

who have lower socioeconomic status (clients). Patrons use their influence and resources to provide protection and benefits to clients, while clients provide support and assistance, including personal services to patrons.

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